

## **FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE, A GREAT CHALLENGE TO STABILITY EGYPT AS A CASE STUDY**

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### **ABSTRACT**

With the oust of the former Islamist president Mohammed Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) candidate for presidency, due to frustrated mass demonstrations on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2013, Egypt witnessed a new phase of war. Since that time, Egypt has been confronting the trio axis of evil, internal violence by the Muslim Brotherhood Organization, terrorist attacks from military extremist organizations and Jihadist gangs and coverts of regional partners. This research poses a major question: does Egypt witness a fourth generation war waged by the aforementioned parties? This article discusses the concept of the Fourth Generation Warfare initiated by William Lind and applies it on Egypt after the 30<sup>th</sup> of June revolution in 2013.

**KEYWORDS:** Fourth Generation Warfare, Muslim Brotherhood, Soft Power, Terrorism, Jihadist Gangs, Regional Partners

### **INTRODUCTION**

In its strive towards political and democratic transformation after the 25<sup>th</sup> of January revolution in 2011, Egypt confronted big challenges, the rise of political Islam headed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ekhwan Al Muslimin) (here and after called MB) and its lust and endeavor to capture authority from top to bottom through the enabilitation (Ikhwanization) process (will be discussed later in this research) and oriented by its deviant and extremist ideology. What worsen the situation are the decrees of release issued by president Morsi for the serious terrorists who were jailed by judicial sentences for their anti-human crimes and terrorist attacks against military and civilian individuals. Due to MB's policies, actions and tactics, the Egyptian people were fed up and demonstrations against MB's president swept the streets on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2013 and ended with the toppling of president Mohamed Morsi; an event which triggered MB members to retrieve their violence based ideology and resort to terrorist actions and motivate their allies from Jihadists organizations to launch military attacks on the Egyptian armed forces and civilians all over Egypt, especially in the Sinai Peninsula. Parallel with these violent attacks, some of Egypt neighbor states supported MB and terrorist gangs on their attacks on Egypt and in addition used their soft power to weaken the Egyptian state not only on the national level but on the regional and global level as well. This situation pushed Egypt to fall as a prey to fourth generation warfare launched by the MB and its allies.

With regard to this issue, this research represents an academic and practical contribution. From an academic perspective, this research provides us with a theoretical context of the nature of the concept of the fourth generation warfare and sheds some light on some the different theories and approaches which discuss it. Besides, it consolidates and

supports the existence of the concept through using practical examples, in this research the case of Egypt, which proves its viability. Moreover, it explains some of the relevant concepts, such as first, second and third generations warfare. From a practical perspective, this research focuses on a real case study, Egypt, and the justifications of using Egypt as a case study. In other words, this research shows clearly how the concept of the fourth generation warfare is applied in reality which makes it easy for readers to comprehend.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of the fourth generation warfare attracted a lot of scholars who are interested in strategic and security issues. Some of these scholars focused on explaining the meaning and nature of this warfare. Others focused on the players involved in this type of war; while others focused on the characteristics of Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW). An example of the first category is William Lind and others in their article “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” They tried to explain what the fourth generation warfare would be like.<sup>1</sup> Another example of this category is a study made by Ghanshyam Singh Katoch with a title “Fourth Generation War: Paradigm for Change.”<sup>2</sup> In which the author’s analysis is restricted to the army component of the defense forces. The author postulated that an army structured for earlier generations of warfare is militarily dysfunctional. Infantry based armies practicing unconventional warfare (UW) aren’t essential for the 4GW battlefield. An example of the second category is Gary Anderson in his article “The End of the Peace of Westphalia: Fourth Generation Warfare”. The author stated that Fourth Generation Warfare would usher in an era when the conventional armies of nation-states would be increasingly challenged by non-state actors using a combination of lethal and nonlethal tactics that would be increasingly difficult for conventional forces to counter, even with revolutionary technology.<sup>3</sup> An example of the third category is Thomas X. Hammes’ article with a title “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation” in which he clarified some of the major tactics and characteristics of Fourth-Generation Warfare.<sup>4</sup> Although the previous authors handled the issue of the Fourth Generation Warfare in different perspectives, all of them focused on establishing the theoretical frame of this type of warfare. This study differs from the previous studies in its applicable framework. While this study starts with a theoretical background about Fourth-Generation Warfare, its core is the application of this type of war on Egypt after the 30<sup>th</sup> of June Revolution as a case study which shows the application of this type of war in reality. It examines the Fourth-Generation Warfare as a concept and how it is relevant and applicable to the case of Egypt. Moreover, it identifies the major state and non-state actors embroiled in this war against Egypt. Finally, it identifies some of the major characteristics and tactics used in this kind of war.

## RESEARCH METHOD

This research adopts the qualitative research approach. In this concern, three questions arise; the first is why the researcher uses the qualitative research approach? Second, which of the qualitative methods is the most appropriate in this research? And why? To answer these questions, the researcher finds it appropriate to start with the pros of the qualitative research approach. Qualitative research methods allow for much more detailed investigation of issues - answering questions of meaning, who is affected (by the issue) why, what factors are involved. The aim of qualitative research is to analyze an empirical phenomenon in its own right by acknowledging its specific structure and dynamics and developing an

<sup>1</sup> Lind, William s, et al. (Oct.1989), “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.”, Marine Corps Gazette.

<sup>2</sup>Katoch, Ghanshyam Singh, (2005), Fourth Generation War: Paradigm for Change, Naval Post Graduate School.

<sup>3</sup> Anderson, Gary, (2013), The End of the Peace of Westphalia: Fourth Generation Warfare. Small Wars Journal

<sup>4</sup> Hammes, Thomas X, (January 2005), “Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves Into a Fourth Generation.” Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University <http://www.ndu.edu/inss>.

understanding of the same.<sup>5</sup> In this research, the qualitative approach allowed the researcher to show detailed analysis and discussions about how the attacks and threats directed towards Egypt from the MB and its allies represent a state of war. It clearly identifies the negative impacts on Egypt's stability and what are the major factors that are behind launching this type of war on Egypt.

### **The Grounded Theory Method (GTM)**

From the various qualitative methods, the researcher chose the Grounded Theory Method (GTM).<sup>6</sup> The objective of GTM is to investigate individual and political practices by taking empirical findings to a higher level of abstraction and developing hypotheses and/or middle-range theories that are empirically grounded – hence the name “Grounded Theory”.<sup>7</sup> GTM is an inductive approach which doesn't depend on previous theoretical knowledge but on factual information or grounded data. The principle task of GTM is the analytical step from data to concepts; it is assumed that any data segment, for example, an interview statement, points to broader underlying ideas. Relevant data segments are therefore considered empirical indicators of theoretical concepts.<sup>8</sup> When GTM is used, data collection and analysis should be iterative, meaning that a first round of data collection should be followed by data analysis and a subsequent round of data collection based on the initial findings.<sup>9</sup> The researcher found it appropriate to use the GTM in this research as it mainly depends on factual information and grounded data to find answers to the major and relevant questions in this research and support the researcher's argument. The researcher collected data and tried to analyze them in order to assist in building a theoretical framework of an applied approach of the fourth generation warfare.

### **Research Structure**

This research is divided into four parts. The first part sheds some light on a factual background about Egypt in the post January revolution era. Second, it shows some theories about the fourth generation warfare and the differences between them. Third, it explains and discusses the elements of the fourth generation warfare and their application on the Egyptian case starting with explaining and analyzing MB strategies, tactics and actions, then discussing the Jihadist terrorist organizations in Sinai Peninsula and their attacks and finally the policies of Turkey, as Egypt regional neighbor, and their negative impacts on the stability of the Egyptian state. Fourth, it ends with a brief analysis and discussion about the applicability of the theory of fourth generation warfare on Egypt.

### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND: POST REVOLUTION ERA IN EGYPT**

When the 25<sup>th</sup> of January Egyptian revolution succeeded to remove Mubarak's regime, hopes of the Egyptian revolutionists mixed with fears; hopes to rescue Egypt and get it out of the dark tunnel after decades of autocracy and

<sup>5</sup> Peters, Ina, (2014), Too Abstract to Be Feasible, Applying the Grounded Theory Method in Social Movement Research, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, p. 5

<sup>6</sup> Becker, Brittney, (2012), The Grounded Theory Method and its uses for political science, Result of the seminar on Methods of Field Research (WS 15272) in the fall semester 2011/12. “Grounded theory methodology was developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss during the 1960s. Their book *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, published in 1967, forms the foundation of the grounded theory method (GTM), which has come to occupy a highly important place among qualitative research methods.”

<sup>7</sup> Mey, Günter/Mruck, Katja (2009): “Methodologie und Methodik der Grounded Theory”. In: Kempf, Wilhelm/Kiefer, Markus (eds): *Forschungsmethoden der Psychologie. Zwischen naturwissenschaftlichem Experiment und sozialwissenschaftlicher Hermeneutik*. Band 3. Berlin: Regener, p. 104 (pp. 100–152.)

<sup>8</sup> Strauss, Anselm L. (1998): *Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung*. 2nd edition. München: p.54.

<sup>9</sup> Mey, Günter/Mruck, Katja, *ibid*, pp. 108-114

political corruption which negatively influenced the different aspects of their lives, e.g., political, economic and social aspects. The three major objectives of the revolution were bread, freedom and social justice; these three objectives indicated the difficulties and challenges which Egyptians suffered from and also indicated how the revolution represents the last resort for the Egyptian people. Moreover, these hopes included the political transformation of Egypt towards a democratic rule based on institutionalism, transparency and justice to rebuild a state governed, ruled and oriented by balanced institutions in an apparatus supervised by checks and balances implemented by these institutions on each other. Besides, these hopes include pushing economic growth and economic development forward to compensate the Egyptians about the harsh economic conditions and social injustices which they suffered from. With regard to fears, these fears were related to the fact that the Egyptian revolution missed the leader; the leader whom people could rally around, a leader who could unify the revolutionists. Moreover, the Egyptian revolution missed the methodology and the procedures to be adopted to start the political transformation in a vivid way which could save Egypt from falling as a prey of terrorism, violence, and the greed of regional partners and enable the revolution to achieve its goals.

Through the three years which succeeded the January revolution, Egypt witnessed a state of turmoil which frustrated, to a large extent, the Egyptian revolutionists and made them feel that their inspired revolution would be assassinated in its cradle. During the first year, 2011-2012, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, SCAF, assumed the authority by a delegation from the recessive president Hosni Mubarak with a reservation from some of the revolutionists who feared from going backward by replacing Mubarak, the military president, with another military regime which may entail another decade of repression. During the rule of the SCAF, the MB Movement tried its best and exerted every effort to distort the image of SCAF and motivate Egyptians to demonstrate and resist against any decision made, any decree taken, or any legislated law by the SCAF. In their movements and actions, the MB headed by their general guide were assisted by regional neighbor states and some terrorist and Jihadist gangs and groups to terrify Egyptians and make them lose confidence in the temporary ruling SCAF to achieve their preeminent goal which is rise to authority.

During the second year, 2012-2013, the year which witnessed the rise of political Islam to authority embodied in the election of Muhammad Morsi, a member in the Muslim Brotherhood, as a president of Egypt for the first time in the Egyptian history when the president of Egypt was a member in a religious group. The MB as a religious movement was established in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan El Banna, the founder of this movement. Under the rule of Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt witnessed and suffered from an intended and vicious division of the society, a division between Muslims and non-Muslims on the one hand and a division among the Muslims themselves. With regards to the division of society between Muslim and non-Muslims, the ideology of MB viewed the prospective Egyptian Society under their rule as a society based on a sort of discrimination between Christians and Muslims, the former were considered infidels and if they don't deserve killing, they have to be treated as second class or non-class citizen. No doubt that such an ideology was about to lead Egypt to a harsh sectarian strife among its citizens. On the other hand inside the Muslim society, Muslims were divided into two categories, the core category and the marginalized one. The core category, exclusively, includes members of the Muslim Brotherhood; these are the only trusted individuals who carry the sword of right against unbelievers. Contrary to the core category is the marginalized one which include Muslims who are non-members in the MB. These non-member Muslims are also considered infidels by some of the extremists MB who considered them a part of the infidel society. Hence, it could be said that Egypt under the rule of the MB was ruled by an extremist minority embracing an ideology which viciously divided the society and used al legitimate and illegitimate means to strengthen their hold on the Egyptian society and to achieve their goal in removing the concept of the Egyptian state and establish instead the Islamic Emirate (Islamic

Province). This ideology led the Egyptian society to a state of resentment, disorder and frustration as the society was divided between a moderate majority which desires a democratic transformation based on a political and an institutional reform and an extremist minority wants the Egyptian state to retain the decades of darkness, ignorance and underdevelopment.

Due to the state of instability which has prevailed in Egypt under the rule of the MB, demonstrations refusing this rule swept Egypt and the MB started to use torture, detentions and to repress the protesters and they used bribes to polarize politicians, thinkers and revolutionists and in case the latter refused to comply with them, they resorted to thugs to force and violence to subjugate these people. As a consequence of the rule of the tyrant oligarchy, a complementary revolution started on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2013 declaring the Egyptian anger and dissatisfaction of the MB rule. The overwhelming resistant movement of June 30, 2013 has been taking place in about 19 public squares in most of the governorates all over Egypt, where people in the millions are asking President Morsi to leave authority. All these tremendous protests reflect the second wave of the stolen revolution of January 25, 2011. The MB was not the ones who started the revolution, but they ended up stealing it and ignoring its objectives. The MB through its political arm "The Justice and Freedom Party" started to execute their secret political strategy to take full control of governmental institutions. Furthermore, they have excluded all secular political groups, whom they call infidels and consider them a part of the infidel society and even the young Egyptian groups from their political strategy. The political policy that was pursued by the dismissed parliament before it was dissolved, as well as by the Consultation Council and President Morsi, aimed directly to benefit the MB and not society at large. Such political actions reflect the ideology, strategy and priority of President Morsi's objectives, instead of giving priority to the deteriorating economic conditions, the absence of national security and safety. The situation that has been going on for the last two years, as well as the protests led finally to the rise of the Tamarud ("rebellion") movement. The Tamarud movement led by Mohamed Bader and his young Egyptian groups initiate a petition campaign to remove President Morsi from office. They have set June 30, 2013, as the date for the second stage of the unfinished Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011. The movement also coordinated with other groups to start a national protest movement to force Morsi to resign and to form a national transitional government to prepare for a national election within six months.<sup>10</sup> Taking into consideration the massive demands of the Egyptian people, national security of Egypt, deteriorating political, economic and social conditions in Egypt, the armed forces headed by Egypt's military commander-in-chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi found it is a national commitment to support the Egyptian demands. Therefore, on Wednesday, the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2013, El-Sisi unveiled a "roadmap" for Egypt's political future proposed by the opposition, which included the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi to make way for snap presidential elections. The roadmap, will include the following points:

- The temporary suspension of the current constitution.
- Empowering the head of Egypt's High Constitutional Court (HCC) to run the country until a new president is elected via early presidential polls.
- Forming a new technocratic government and asking the HCC to hasten the passing of a parliamentary elections law, currently being reviewed by the HCC, to allow for parliamentary elections.
- Forming a committee to amend controversial articles of the temporarily suspended constitution.

<sup>10</sup><http://mid-east-today.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-egyptian-second-revolution-of-june.html>.

- Laying down a media code of ethics to guarantee the media's professionalism.
- Forming a committee to foster "national reconciliation."
- Taking immediate steps to include youth in decision making circles.

In his televised statement, El-Sisi stressed that the armed forces had no intention to enter political life, but said it would "never turn a blind eye to the aspirations of the Egyptian people."<sup>11</sup>

Once this road map was unveiled and published to the public, the extremist Islamists directed and oriented by the MB organization and extremist terrorist groups and gangs, Hamas, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Al Dawla Al Islamiya fi Al Iraq Wal Sham: DAESH), here and after Called DAESH in this paper, and Beit Al-Makdes assisted by some states, Turkey, launched a comprehensive war against Egypt; a war of a different nature to destabilize Egypt, a war of the fourth generation. Defeats of the major powers, US in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, France in Vietnam and Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and Russia in Chechnya and the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, makes it a commitment on the global community to assist Egypt with its modest military force to overcome this disastrous type of warfare.<sup>12</sup>

## THE NATURE OF THE WAR OF THE FOURTH GENERATION

War continuously changes. War doesn't change in how it is fought but in who fights and what they are fighting for and although war is changing, it is now changing faster and on a larger scale than at any time in the past.<sup>13</sup> William Lind and others in their article "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." said that the purpose of their paper was to pose a question about what the fourth generation warfare would be like and not to answer it.<sup>14</sup> Really, there is no clear cut answer to this question. Moreover, the fourth generation warfare generation must be distinguished from previous generations of warfare. First Generation includes tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket. Lind describes First Generation warfare (1GW) as beginning after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War and establishing the state's need to organize and conduct war.<sup>15</sup> The second generation warfare (2GW) used tactics of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire. This type of warfare can be seen in the early stages of WWI where there was still strict adherence to drill and discipline of formation and uniform. However, there remained a dependence on artillery and firepower to break the stalemate and move towards a pitched battle.<sup>16</sup> Third Generation (3GW) embraced tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The third generation military pursues to bypass the enemy, and attack his rear forward, such as the tactics used by German Storm Troopers in WWI against the British and French in order to break the trench warfare stalemate.<sup>17</sup> These aspects of (3GW) bleed into the fourth generation warfare (4GW) as it is also warfare of speed and initiative; however, it targets both military forces and home populations. In brief, the theory of the fourth generation warfare holds that warfare has evolved through four generations, first, the use of massed manpower, second, firepower, third, maneuver, and now fourth, an evolved form of insurgency that exploits all available networks, political, economic,

<sup>11</sup> <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75631.aspx>

<sup>12</sup> Hammes, Thomas X, Ibid. p 2.

<sup>13</sup> FMFM 1-A, Draft 4.3 12 August 2008, Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps.p3

<sup>14</sup> Lind, William s, et al. Ibid, p22

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p23

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Lind, William s. (September-October 2004), "Understanding Fourth Generation War.", Military Review, p 13.

social, military to persuade an opponent's decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly.<sup>18</sup>

The concept of the fourth generation warfare is highly broad and comprehensive; the following brief literature will show the disparities among scholars in their endeavor to define it. A good start is to begin with William Lind's concept. William Lind viewed that fourth generation warfare includes four major aspects; first, the battlefield which comprehends the whole society. Second, using heavy arms, military equipment and centralized logistics decreased. Third, there is more dependence on maneuver and spry and easy-moving forces. Fourth, the major goal is to destroy the society internally and physically; objectives will include population, culture and infrastructure; strategic centers of gravity will be highly targeted.<sup>19</sup> In the fourth generation warfare, the state loses its monopoly on war; state militaries find themselves confronting non-state actors.<sup>20</sup> Almost everywhere the state is bleeding. Greg Simons thought that the fourth generation warfare (4GW) emphasized the issues of identity, culture and self-determination; this kind of war arises due to disparities based on premises of spirituality and righteousness than the exercise of the blunt military force between the conflicting parties.<sup>21</sup> Fourth generation war is not a military but a political, social, and moral revolution; a crisis of the legitimacy of the state conceived by some of the citizen of the state. These citizens are diverting their primary loyalties away from the state to their ethnic groups, religious gangs and ideologies, etc.<sup>22</sup> They will not only fight for their primary loyalty and no longer fight for the state but they will fight the state itself for their loyalty. Moreover, Fourth generation warfare is characterized by explicit or implicit state intervention in the internal affairs of other states through supporting the dissent groups to destabilize the concerned state. These states are clearly supporting terrorist activities with money, weapons, and safe havens, and the terrorists themselves rely on the support, even if passive, of established communities.<sup>23</sup> Thomas Hammes described this war as a modern form of insurgency; those who launch this type of war pursue to persuade their enemy political leaders that their strategic objectives are either inaccessible or highly costly.<sup>24</sup> According to Hammes, the fourth generation warfare includes four aspects, political, strategic, operational and tactical.<sup>25</sup>

To sum up, 4GW perspectives are based on an evolutionary model of warfare, 30 of June revolution with a theory of what 4GW actually is. For the evolutionary model, Hammes follows Lind and Wilson's (1989) model of generations of warfare moving from post-feudal wars based on nation states (exemplified by Napoleonic Wars), 'industrial war' (exemplified by the First World War), an increasing development of maneuverability (exemplified by *Blitzkrieg*), through to 4GW (exemplified by informal, non-state warfare amongst groups of combatants rather than formal militaries).<sup>26</sup>

From the various and different perspectives of the fourth generation warfare, this paper adopts Simmons and Hammes' perspective and applies it on the political and strategic objectives of the parties launching this war against Egypt and their tactics and operations. The researcher here tries to answer a major question: is the theory of the fourth generation warfare applicable on the case of Egypt? If yes, what are the major evidences which support this application? First, this

<sup>18</sup> Echevarria, Antulio J. (2005), "Fourth Generation War And Other Myth." www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pp. 23-24.

<sup>20</sup> Lind, William s, ibid, p 13

<sup>21</sup> Simons, Greg. (August, 2010), "Fourth Generation Warfare And The Clash of Civilizations.", Journal of Islamic Studies Advance Access, P2.

<sup>22</sup> FMFM 1-A, Draft, Ibid, p4

<sup>23</sup> Echevarria, Antulio J, ibid, pp. 5-6

<sup>24</sup> Hammes, Thomas X, ibid, p 1.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, pp. 2-5.

<sup>26</sup> Jackson, Paul (August 2007), "Are Africa's Wars Part of a Fourth Generation of Warfare?", Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 28, Issue 2 p 267.

paper is going to shed some light on the MB Movement in Egypt, its political and strategic and objectives and its operations and tactics.

## **MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB) MOVEMENT IN EGYPT**

In 1928, Hassan Al Banna, with his followers established the MB Movement, here and after called MB to become one of the oldest, largest and most influential Islamist organizations in Egypt. In the beginning, MB politically aimed at fighting imperialism and Western neo-colonialism, restoring the caliphate and achieving the re-Islamization of Egyptian society. After 1952, it became clear that MB wasn't fighting imperialism to liberalize Egypt from the foreign rule (British colonization) or the re-Islamization of the Egyptian society; however, this was a part of their ideology and strategy. The major goal of MB was to reach authority. All other objectives which were declared by the MB Guidance, return to Islam in its pure form or bring Muslims back to their religious beliefs were masks of MB to reach their optimal and desired goal. In its endeavor to reach authority, MB considers all means legitimate. Persuasion is legitimate and violence is legitimate too. If persuasion failed, violence is inevitable.

### **MB's Political and Strategic Objectives**

The MB was founded to express a two-fold purpose was: (1) to implement sharia worldwide, and (2) to re-establish the imperial Islamic state (caliphate) due to the dissolution of the caliphate and the transformation of Turkey from the center of the Islamic world to a secular nation. The main purpose was to unify the Islamic states under a new caliphate and subordinating all lands to the Caliph's rule pursuant to sharia. It is evident from their creed "God is our objective; the Koran is our law; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations." and from the Brotherhood's history and current activities that violence is an inherent part of the MB's tactics. Also, it must be clear that the MB objective isn't confined to the Western world but to their Eastern societies as well. All societies with no exception, which doesn't implement the MB's version of Sharia (Islamic Code), are considered infidel and hence Jihad (violence) is the only way to purify them if persuasion fails. To start the process of objective achievements, MB used soft and radical tactics. Soft tactics are used for persuasion and polarizing, while radical tactics, violence, are used for repression and coercion.

### **MB's Soft Tactics**

Concerning soft tactics, MB adopted a variety of measures. Ideologically and politically speaking, MB has evolved focusing more on social, economic, and political aspects from a religious perspective.<sup>27</sup> The MB in its early stages used various organizational tactics such as propaganda, programs of physical and ideological training, insistence on discipline and obedience, secret cells and a large youth corps.<sup>28</sup> Its members participated in social activities such as working in charitable community work, constructing and managing mosques, schools, hospitals, and social clubs, and establishing firms and trades unions.<sup>29</sup> As part of their social work, these members motivated and supervised each other's obedience and commitment of personal morality laid down in Islamic Code (Sharia). The MB in Egypt adopted a strategy of permeating inside political institutions over which the regime had lost control. Therefore, they penetrated student

<sup>27</sup>Holger Albrecht, 'How can opposition support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt', *Democratization*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2005, pp. 385-386.

<sup>28</sup> Mohammed Zahid and Michael Medley, 'Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt & Sudan', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 110, 2006, pp. 693-694

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p 694

unions, clinics, welfare institutions, and professional syndicates, including the professional associations of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and journalists. They controlled a large number of private mosques. The MB focused on the shortcomings of the Egyptian government.<sup>30</sup> This wasn't done or stemmed from their social responsibility or moral obligations but only to pinpoint the deficiencies of the government or the regime as a whole. The MB tried to fill the gap for the social needs Egyptian state has been either unable or unwilling to fulfill. Through this approach, the MB drew most of its initial support from rural-to-urban migrants who led difficult lives in Egypt.<sup>31</sup> Then, they rallied support from the middle classes, who were unhappy with the economic policies of the government and its western alliance's; these people viewed the MB as a competent organization capable of delivering services and fulfilling demands which the government failed to provide and satisfy.<sup>32</sup>

For the MB, education received the first priority in its agenda setting. Through controlling education, the MB can spread its message and penetrate society and manipulate mentalities towards its interests to create an Islamic society through preaching and education; through education, it has focused on changing the outlook of individuals first, then families, and finally the society.<sup>33</sup> Since the sequent Egyptian governments have been quite in competent in spreading education throughout the country, particularly to rural areas, the MB took over this task; it engaged in many educational activities, such as establishing primary and secondary schools for boys and girls, as well as technical schools for workers, and Quran classes and basic skills classes for the illiterate. Through education, the MB polarized and recruited many members from among its students, who eventually became recruiters for the organization, starting from their families and schools and moving outwards into the society.<sup>34</sup>

To discuss the willingness of the MB to permeate inside the educational system, Butko's publication in which he tested Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony could explain this willingness. Butko revealed that Islamist Movements, MB in this research, strove to establish a counter hegemonic bloc that aimed to challenge the political order imposed by the ruling hegemon, in this research the secular Egyptian governments. A successful formation of a counter hegemonic block involves complex social processes in which the whole moral order of society is being transformed.<sup>35</sup> According to Gramsci, hegemony shouldn't be exclusively defined as the ruling class maintenance of power, but also as a process through which social groups expand and maintain their power. In case these social groups manage to form their own hegemony through creating and consolidating their principles, in Gramsci's phrasing this is when hegemonic bloc comes to existence.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to its endeavor to penetrate the educational system, raise and polarize new members and manipulate mentalities to consolidate their base in societies, the MB tried to transfer the image of the savior of the Egyptians from the harsh and cruel living conditions from which they suffer. For example, with regard to health care, Egyptian governments

<sup>30</sup> Stark Jan, *Beyond Terrorism and State Hegemony: Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia*, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2005, pp. 312-313;

<sup>31</sup> Caromba, Laurence and Hussein Solomon, "Understanding Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," *African Security Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2008, p.119

<sup>32</sup> Nedorosick, Jeffrey A, *Extremist Groups in Egypt, Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 14, No. 2. Summer 2002, p 51

<sup>33</sup> Botman, Selma, *From Independence to Revolution*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 120

<sup>34</sup> Leiken, Robert and Steven Brook, (2007) *Moderate Muslim Brotherhood*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2, p 108

<sup>35</sup> Butko, Thomas, J., (2004), *Revelation or Revolution, A Gramscian Approach to The Rise of Political Islam*. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 31, 1, pp. 41-62.

<sup>36</sup> Gramsci, Antonio, 1971, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Q. Hoare & G.N.Smith, eds & Trans. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

have failed to provide a sufficient healthcare system, and even when such services are offered, patients generally cannot afford them. To fill this gap, the MB opened numerous health clinics all over Egypt.<sup>37</sup> Besides, The MB has also been active in initiating social and economic reform in Egypt by setting up urban projects that provide jobs for the unemployed and poor, and industrial and commercial enterprises that can compete with Egypt's non-Islamic entrepreneurs; it even opened discount grocery shops for the poorer sections of the population. By doing so, the MB has increased the organization's own financial capacities, permitting it to fund its projects for education, health care, and welfare through an Islamic economic sector.<sup>38</sup>

From a political perspective, the MB tried and succeeded to enter the political process by attempting to become influential in relevant civil society organizations and participates in elections whenever they are permitted. Once they understood that the government would not let them get involved in politics through elections, as MB was banned from participating in politics by official decrees long time ago, they channeled all their energy into various civil society organizations.<sup>39</sup> In their attempt to Islamize Egypt's political institutions, the most important project of the MB was to infiltrate professional syndicates (trade unions such as teachers, doctors, and lawyers), which have significant power in Egyptian politics. Such a move would allow them to easily challenge the economic and political power of the state. By the beginning of the 1990s, the New Guards that were consisted of younger and more educated members of the MB were able to gain majorities on the boards of engineers, doctors, and the lawyers 'syndicates. They also controlled other trade unions through affiliated syndicates outside Cairo, or through the activities of the syndicates Liberty and Islamic Law committees. The objective of these committees was to rally support, through conferences and public gatherings, for *Sharia* as the system of law in Egypt. Members of the MB did not look for the presidency of these syndicates; instead they pursued to control their ruling councils. Thus, they supported the presidency of the government's candidate, and these presidents then worked as a bridge between the Brotherhood's members and the regime.<sup>40</sup> Step by step, the New Guards began to use these syndicates as political platforms for holding meetings and conferences to initiate political opposition, influence Egypt's educated elites, and affect economic and foreign policy. Another important step taken by the MB to penetrate the political arena was the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political hand of the MB. Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke argue that the MB finds democracy compatible with its notion of a slow Islamization, in which they justify democracy on Islamic grounds, pointing out that the Muslim community (the *umma*) is the source of political authority. By following democratic means, they argue, the people will eventually vote for Islamic leaders. Consequently, in spite of all obstacles and widespread fraud in elections, the MB first attempted to establish political parties to gain popularity.<sup>41</sup>

### **MB's Radical Tactics**

Since, until recently, the MB was banned from participating in the elections freely, it directed all of its energy into providing social services and engaging in political activities in Egyptian syndicates. During this period, the MB has consistently shown its commitment to a democratic system of government. However, after the MB Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won the People's Assembly Elections by the beginning of 2012 and when the Muslim Brotherhood candidate

<sup>37</sup> Farag, Nadine, (2011), *Between Piety and Politics: Social Services and the Muslim Brotherhood*, Frontline, PBS. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh>

<sup>38</sup> Nedoroscik, *ibid*, p 51.

<sup>39</sup> Ninette S. Fahmy, (1998) *the Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform?* Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 4, , p. 554.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>41</sup> Leiken, Robert and Steven Brook, *ibid*, p 110

Morsi was elected as the president in June 2012, the second face of the coin starts to emerge. Moderate characteristics to initiate social, political and economic reforms proclaimed the MB were replaced by lust for authority and oriented towards weakening of the Egyptian state. With its soft tactics, MB tried to divide and polarize the Egyptian society spreading its hegemonic culture and rally the support of the poor and middle classes and motivate them to oppose state policies. Assuming the authority, the MB, in its strive to weaken the Egyptian state adopted various measures, first, Ikhwanization of governmental institutions, second, escalation of conflict with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the judiciary and political actors, third adopting repressive measures against the opposition and fourth directing violent measures towards the armed forces, police and civilians.

### **Ikhwanization of Governmental Institutions**

By late August 2012, Morsi and the Brothers (Ekhwan) have all but completed their consolidation of total control over Egypt – both government and society. In Cairo, both supporters and detractors talk of the swift and comprehensive “Ikhwanization” of Egypt. In the nearly two months since Morsi’s swearing in, the Ekhwan completed the most profound purge and reconstitution of the institutes of governance in the history of modern Egypt. Given the inherent power and influence of the Egyptian authoritarian system of governance, it is only a question of time before the “Ikhwanization” of official Egypt will evolve into the profound “Ikhwanization” of Egyptian society. Morsi’s “Ikhwanization” of Egypt depended on prepared lists of handpicked members of the MB and loyal Islamist sympathizers for the myriad of vacated positions. Nevertheless, Islamists now dominate the Egyptian high-command, most cabinet and advisory posts, governors, heads of state-owned news organs, the powerful media council, and the national council for human rights.<sup>42</sup> On 27 August, Morsi further strengthened his presidential powers when he named 21 advisers and aides with executive authorities. The vast majority were politically-reliable Islamist-leaning stalwarts, although the list also included three women and two Christians as a token compromise. Subsequently, Morsi ignored his campaign promises to appoint a Christian and a woman as vice presidents, insisting that the nomination of advisers was sufficient. In early September, Morsi and the Ekhwan were fast assuming total control of Egypt. Morsi’s new bureaucracy is now focusing on entrenching long-term Ekhwan and Islamist authority. Morsi’s appointees now dominate the committee charged with drafting the new constitution, and are directly responsible for such key issues as the relations between religion and state, the role of the military in the state, the form of local government and governance and most important, the structure and rules for future elections.<sup>43</sup> Ultimately, the Ekhwan tightly control the recruitment and placement of all future candidates for employment by government, civil, police and military, in the government schools that are mandatory for the launching of careers in government service. Significantly, throughout these undertakings, the MB and their affiliated entities continued operating under strict secrecy as if they were still under persecution. The Brothers tightly protect their funding and budget, the recruitment and member retention policies, and, most important, their clandestine decision-taking process under the Supreme Council whose membership is unknown. Therefore, no matter how much attention is focused on Morsi’s office, Egypt’s real source of power and policy formulation remains hidden and secure from the outside world.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Bodansky, Yossef, (2012), Power Change in Egypt – Internal and External Repercussions, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, Issue (4). pp. 12-13.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

### Escalation of Conflict

The MB President Mohammed Morsi escalated the conflict with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the judiciary and political actors. As soon as Muslim Brotherhood candidate Morsi was elected as the president in June 2012, in an attempt to challenge the Armed Forces, he issued his own decree commanding the People's Assembly that was dissolved by the military to convene. He wanted the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Supreme Constitutional Court to reverse their decision and respect the popularly elected Assembly until the new Constitution was approved.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, in August 2012, President Morsi in an attempt to assert his authority, challenged the military by revoking the interim declaration and transferred the powers of the generals as well as the legislative authority to the presidency. In addition, he made personnel changes in top military positions by forcing the Defense Minister and head of the armed forces for retirement and made himself the chairman of the SCAF. Furthermore, when the reaction on the streets increased for the slow pace of change, in November 2012 President Morsi issued another constitutional declaration that granted him as the president with far-reaching powers. His decree stripped the judiciary of any right to challenge his decisions and dissolve the Constituent Assembly, People's Assembly and the Shura Council. Moreover, it gave the president the right to take all measures that are necessary to any threat to the revolution, national unity or national security.<sup>46</sup> When his decision led to more protests and violence on the streets, in a dramatic U-turn President Morsi agreed with the judicial authorities to limit the extent of the decree. In November 2012, President Morsi also ratified a law that allowed the government to appoint its loyalists to the Egyptian Trade Union Federation. This law granted the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated minister in charge of manpower the right to appoint workers to the vacant positions in the Egyptian Trade Union Federation as well as board members of unions to fill the vacant seats on the board.<sup>47</sup> The reason for the next uproar on the streets was the approval of the draft of the constitution by the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly. Although the secular circles and the Coptic Church boycotted the draft, which enhanced the role of Islam and restricted freedom of speech and assembly, President Morsi called a referendum for mid December 2012. He did not take opposition's demands for the postponement of the referendum into consideration. Moreover, he authorized the armed forces to keep order until the referendum is held.<sup>48</sup> All these developments, the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate on one side and the military and the judiciary on the other side show that in the context of current political situation Muslim Brotherhood, represented in the leadership of President Morsi is not planning to follow the pretended moderate path as the organization had followed during the rule of the authoritarian leaders of Egypt.<sup>49</sup>

### Resort to Violence, an Inherent Component in the MB Ideology

A lot of debates arose about violence in the MB ideology, is it an outcome of the repressive policies and actions of the Egyptian state or is violence an inherent contention in the MB's ideology? Two points of view tried to explain this. On

<sup>45</sup> 'Presentation and Full English text of Morsi's Decree Restoring Parliament', Ahram online, 9 July 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/47250/> Egypt/Presentation-and-full-English-text-of-Morsis-decre.aspx (Accessed on 21.02.2013)

<sup>46</sup> Egypt Crisis: Morsi Offers Concession in Decree Annulment', BBC News, 9 December 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20655412> (Accessed on 21.02.2013).

<sup>47</sup> Morsy Issues Law Paving Way for Brotherhood Control of Trade Federation, Egypt Independent, 26 11. 2012, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issues-law-paving-way-broth-erhood-control-trade-federation> (Accessed on 15.02.2013).

<sup>48</sup> Egypt: Who Holds the Power: 'Egypt Profile', BBC News, 15 January 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13315719> (Accessed on 21.02.2013).

<sup>49</sup> Aknur, Muge, (2013), The Muslim Brotherhood in Politics in Egypt: From Moderation to Authoritarianism? Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika, p 20 Cilt: 9, Sayı: 33, ss.1-25,

the one hand, Mohamed Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz argued that violent contention is the consequence of tactical considerations informed by the realities of repressive frameworks. MB engages in a rational calculus about tactical efficacy and chooses modes of contention they believe will facilitate the achievement of objectives or secure their organizational and political gains. Violence is only one of myriad alternatives in repertoires of contention and becomes most likely where regimes attempt to crush Islamic activism through broad repressive measures that leave few alternatives. In Egypt, MB viewed the cycle of violence began largely in response to a broad crackdown on the Islamic movement that ensnared moderates, radicals, and number of tangential bystanders; the crackdown included arrests, torture, executions, and other forms of state violence.<sup>50</sup> From this perspective, violent Islamic contention is produced not by ideational factors or unstable psychological mentalities but rather by exogenous contingencies created through state policy concerning Islamists.

On the other hand, the researcher and others<sup>51</sup> argued that resort to violence is an inherent contention and an essential component in the MB ideology. This argument is based on the writings of Hassan El Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brother Organization, and Sayyed Qutb the major ideologist in the MB Movement. In his Messages, Hassan Al Banna identified the major principles of the MB, Allah is our objective, the Messenger is our leader, Quran is our law, dying in the way of God is our highest hope and Jihad is our way. Jihad in the MB doctrine is the use of the sword. Jihad is the resort to violence to achieve the holy and sacred objectives. It is the means to die in the way of Allah. In terms of achievements of goals, Jihad doesn't distinguish between people. The sword must be used against those who hinder the attainment of goals whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. Those who aren't supporting and advocating these goals, Muslims or non-Muslims, must be fought against. Al-Banna's in his own words, delivered in 1938 before the Fifth Conference gathering of Brotherhood members, said that if Egyptian authorities did not adopt the Brotherhood's program of Islamic reform, then the Brotherhood would unequivocally remain "at war with every leader, every party and every organization that does not work for the victory of Islam".<sup>52</sup> Al-Banna's call for war against the Egyptian government eventually translated into violent action in the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood's so called Secret Apparatus which frequently engaged in acts of terrorism directed against both the Egyptian state and the British Occupation.<sup>53</sup> Interestingly, Rinehart observes that as members of the Secret Apparatus completed militant training, "they were instructed to pretend they had given up membership in the Muslim Brotherhood and were told to join other activist organizations" so as to obfuscate the Brotherhood's involvement in acts of terrorism.<sup>54</sup> Such observation only underscores the notion that although the Brotherhood may seek to purport itself as purely a social movement that eschews violence as a medium to effect political change, resort to terrorism by the Brotherhood so as to achieve its goals remains an essential strategy if political change does not occur in a timely fashion.<sup>55</sup>

In his manifesto, Milestones, Sayyid Qutb, a major ideologist in the MB, writes that the world is divided into two kinds of societies: Muslim and non-Muslim, jahiliyya (ignorance) societies. In Muslim societies, Islam is applied to all aspects of life through observance of Sharia. Consequently, Qutb believed that real Islamic society was, according to MB

<sup>50</sup> Hafez, Mohamed, M., Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement, p 62

<sup>51</sup> Jones, Robert, (2013), A Recipe for Violence: Conditions in Which the Muslim Brotherhood is Likely to Support Terrorism as a Means to Effect Political Change, Global Security Studies, vol.(3), pp. 43-52.

<sup>52</sup> Rinehart, C. S. (2009). Volatile Breeding Grounds: The Radicalization of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (32), p 980 (pp. 953-988)

<sup>53</sup> Jones, Robert, *ibid*, p 45

<sup>54</sup> Rinehart, C. S. *ibid*, p 982

<sup>55</sup> Jones, Robert, *ibid*, p 45

perspective, by its very nature, the only civilized society, and the jahili societies, in all their various forms, are backward societies. It is necessary to elucidate this great truth.<sup>56</sup> Qutb defined a jahili society as any society that does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs, in its observances of worship and its legal regulations. Jahili included all Christian and Jewish societies as well as all idolatrous societies.<sup>57</sup> Qutb ruled out any accommodation with the jahili system; the only proper Muslim relationship with jahiliyya was one of complete rejection. As such, those Muslim societies that chose to incorporate elements of jahili systems into the Islamic framework, that is, through the adoption of a secular government or legal systems, were also jahiliyya.<sup>58</sup> As the enemy of Islam they were to be destroyed. For Qutb jahiliyya societies are incapable of offering an individual true freedom. Qutb believed that true Muslims in the vanguard MB movement must engage in a constant struggle against the influence of jahiliyya. He believed that revolution, not reform, and was required. It is only through the total destruction of secular societies that the Islamic system could be secure. Thus Qutb wrote, the foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose of jahiliyya from the leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the [Islamic] way of life through Jihad. The term jihad, meaning struggle or striving (in the way of God), was central to Qutb's radical form of Islam. Jihad was necessary in order to make the Islamic way dominant in the world and was commanded by the Quran. Qutb believed that since the objective of the message of Islam is a decisive declaration of man's freedom, not merely on the philosophical plane but also in the actual conditions of life, it must employ jihad. According to Qutb, jihad is a legitimate method by which Islam may seek victory over the influence of jahiliyya, thus ensuring the sovereignty of God on earth.<sup>59</sup> Qutb rejected the writings of those who stipulated that Islamic jihad is only permissible in a defensive war. Qutb's rationale for using armed violence was associated with the notion of justified conflict against one's enemy. The reasons for jihad are 'to establish God's authority on the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems in life; to end the lordship of one man over others. Jihad is the physical power that Islam should bring to bear in order to abolish the jahili system.<sup>60</sup> The Brotherhood's support of terrorism as a viable strategy however is further demonstrated in its more contemporary leadership's statements praising the use of terrorism as a legitimate means to resist the Egyptian government. The statements of Yussuf al- Qaradawi, widely viewed as a leading theologian within the Brotherhood's ranks, are most revealing in regard to Brotherhood support of terrorism violence. Lorenzo Vidnio, in a revealing analysis of the Brotherhood's likelihood to support acts of terrorism, is keen to note Al-Qaradawi's 2003 statements, in which the influential cleric "laid out five categories of terrorism, including 'terror that is permitted by Islamic law' and 'martyrdom operations.'<sup>61</sup> Al-Qaradawi stresses the that jihad becomes a commitment upon every Muslim if a Muslim land is attacked, or Muslims suffer from fitna (are prevented from freedom of faith), and that every Muslim must practice some form of jihad, be it fighting against one's instincts and desires, against evil and corruption, and endeavoring to promote good and support religion, as much as one can.

From the above-mentioned information, it is clear that the use of violence is a belief for the MB. All their articles,

<sup>56</sup> Sayyid Qutb, (1979) *Milestones*, Mother Mosque Foundation, New York, p. 94.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p.81

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 63. For a discussion of jihad see R. C. Martin, *Religious Violence in Islam: Towards an Understanding of the Discourse on Jihad in Modern Egypt*, in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (eds), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1987, p. 61.

<sup>60</sup> Virginia Murr, *The Power of Ideas: Sayyid Qutb and Islamism*, Rockford College Summer Research Project 2004, Rockford College, 2004, at <http://www.stephenhicks.org/Murr%20on%Qutb.php>.

<sup>61</sup> Vidnio, L. (2010). *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, New York: Colombia University Press, pp. 211-12

books, speeches of their leaders entail explicitly or implicitly that reference to violence is a necessity to confront the insane societies. In order to attract young people and brainwash them, it isn't called violence but instead Jihad which means dying for Allah. They always inculcate the young members that to become a martyr is utmost wish. This martyrdom can't be achieved without fighting for the cause of Allah through eliminating the insane (Jahili) societies and replace them with MB Society.

### **A brief MB's History of Violence in Egypt, from Past to Present**

Since resort to violence, Jihad, in MB's ideology is an essential component of the MB's strategy, MB's violence and terrorist actions started long time ago in Egypt. Resort to violent actions has been a means to weaken and subjugate the Egyptian state. As previously mentioned, violence is a necessity to adopt the Brotherhood's program of Islamic reform, a program which must be imposed on any society where MB exists. "Rule you or kill you" a principle embraced by all members of MB. This explains why MB resorted to violence from the first years of their establishment. Violent actions started by assassinating prominent political and judicial figures in Egypt. On 24 February 1945 Brotherhood assassinated Ahmed Maher prime minister of Egypt in the Egyptian parliament, after Hassan Al-Bana founder of Muslim Brotherhood organization lost the elections. On 22 March 1948, Brotherhood assassinated judge Ahmad Khazendar who sentenced to jail members of the Brotherhood committed terror acts in Cairo (burned Cinema Metro). MB tried to assassinate president Gamal Abdel Nasser many times from 1954 to 1960 and On 6 October 1981, Al-gamaa Al-Islamia in association with Muslim Brotherhood assassinated Late President Sadat.

Since July 2013, Egyptians have been under constant attack, in a vain attempt to derail Egypt from its path toward peaceful, pluralistic democracy. Jihadists are carrying out sophisticated attacks in Egypt, bringing with them increased expertise and ability to deploy deadly tactics such as remote detonations, suicide attacks and surface-to-air missile strikes. Of the terrorists who have been arrested, 95 are foreign nationals. Evidence gathered from recent attacks also prove that alliances were formed between the Muslim Brotherhood's leading members and several locally and internationally-based groups with a recorded history of militant and terrorist activity. Furthermore, Morsi's government provided safe haven for foreign militants who infiltrated the country and triggered a massive influx of weapons from Libya and elsewhere. While in power, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to transform the Egyptian state and its institutions to further its goal of imposing its rigid, ideological vision on Egypt. To achieve this objective, Morsi released from prison hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members and issued presidential pardons for over 400 convicts jailed on charges of terrorism.<sup>62</sup> The breadth and increased intensity of terrorist activity increased tremendously during 2013, disrupting lives and killing Egyptians across the country. Significant recent attacks include: June 29/2013 : Ministry of Interior's North Sinai inspector Brigadier Mohamed Hany is assassinated in El-Khalafa, August 10: Security forces disrupt a jihadi plot to destroy the Al-Salam Bridge crossing the Suez Canal, September 5 A suicide car bomber targets Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim in Cairo suburb Nasr City, October 6: Police found at least 51 bombs in Cairo district of Shubra, October 7: A TV satellite station in the Cairo suburb of Maadi comes under a rocket propelled grenade attack, October 7: Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis kills three police officers in car bombing. November 20: Suicide bombers drive an explosive car into a convoy of military buses killing 11 soldiers and injuring dozens more and injures dozens o December 17: Car bomb in Suez city of Ismailia kills 1, December 24: Mansoura suicide bomb kills 16 and injures over 120.<sup>63</sup> In 2014/15 serious attacks by the MB against

<sup>62</sup> FACT SHEET: Terrorism In Egypt, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2013.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

Egyptians continued. One of the most serious attacks targeted the Prosecutor General in Egypt who was killed on the 29<sup>th</sup> of June 2015. This attack was followed by a big number of attacks against the police, the army and civilians.

The above mentioned information shows clearly how the MB was trying to destabilize the Egyptian state diversifying its tactics between soft and hard tactics. The MB tried first by manipulating mentalities through brainwashing the illiterate. It used religion as a support to their claims. In addition, it played on the significance of religion for Egyptians pretending that it represent the rescue of the Egyptian society from the ignorant and corrupt governments. MB leaders in their speeches declared that they are the swords of right which God delegated and only them to remove the insane and corrupt governments and to transform the Egyptian society from ignorance to the rule of Sharia. When the MB recognized that Egyptians are not easily deceived by their claims and lies, it turned to violence and coercion to subjugate the Egyptians. Therefore, the sword replaced the word and this is inevitable to reach the goals.

To analyze the MB tactics, soft and hard, the researcher uses Greg Simon's analysis. Simons in his analysis argued that the Fourth Generation War is a war of identity based on premises of rightness. He clarified that a certain group in a certain society tries to establish its own identity and enhance and support it with all means. In this research, the MB represents this type of group. The MB, from its beginning in 1928 to the present has been striving to establish its identity using soft or hard and legitimate or illegitimate means. This identity is based on MB's beliefs, values and norms which are incompatible with real Islam. Satisfying all demands of its members, inculcating them with its beliefs and values through socialization process, the MB was able to gain their loyalty to the extent that hearing and obedience is the essential commitment for all members. To achieve its goals, the MB adopted social, political and economic measures to initiate a revolutionary spirit among Egyptians to resist the Egyptian sequent governments. Besides, to achieve its objectives persuasion and violence are used interchangeably. Not only was the MB able to gain the loyalty of its members but it also managed to shift their loyalty from their state, Egypt, to it as a group. Of course, this shift of loyalty has great negative impacts on the Egyptian state.

#### **MB's Coalitions with Terrorist Groups in Sinai**

Not only did the MB implement terrorist attacks on the Egyptians by its members, but also consolidated relationships with terrorists groups in the Sinai Peninsula. A big number of the members of these groups was imprisoned and retained by Mubarak regime and some of them were sentenced to death due to crimes they committed. Although these members were convicted by law, the MB president Mohamed Morsi released them without any legal base to use them to terrify Egyptians and to give an impression to Egyptians that the MB is their last resort or rescue from the corrupt Mubarak regime on the one hand and the violence of the terrorist groups on the other hand. Moreover, the MB made coalitions with a big number of these groups, gave them promises of amnesty and to leave Sinai for them as a training court for their militants attacks. Examples of these groups are Salafiya Jihadiya, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, Tawhid wal Jihad and Takfir wal Higma.

Sinai is a peninsula in northeastern Egypt. Since the outset of Mubarak in February 2011, instability has been increasing in the Sinai Peninsula. Although mainland Egypt has experienced an increase in sectarian violence, it seems that Sinai has re-emerged as a "security hotspot" after the revolution. Egyptian authorities have lost control of large swathes of

Sinai since the overthrow of former president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011.<sup>64</sup> A security vacuum has allowed for increased organizational and operational capacity of terrorist groups in the area. Terrorist groups tend to target state infrastructure and security forces, coordinating with local Bedouin who have long harbored grievances against Cairo due to years of marginalization and mistreatment.<sup>65</sup> Attacks often target police stations, checkpoints, government offices, and the Arab Gas Pipeline between Egypt and Israel in north Sinai.

Synchronized with the MB's violence and the terrorist attacks by the Jihadists gangs, Egypt witnessed a conspiracy from regional partners, especially Turkey. Both countries which are the main resorts of the extremist members of the MB capture every opportunity to remove the new elected regime led by president El-Sisi and to create a sort of mistrust between the Egyptian people and its leadership. No doubt that each of these countries is motivated and pushed by its coverts. In addition, each of these countries used various tools to achieve their objectives. In the following paragraphs these points will be discussed and analyzed.

## REGIONAL PARTNERS

The history of Egypt's regional relations stands as an evidence of Egypt's cooperation with its regional partners, Arabs and Non-Arabs. That is why the conduct of regional partners, Turkey, was a shock to the Egyptian people and its leadership. Egypt never expected this unjustified interference by the two states in its internal affairs and the irresponsible violation of its sovereignty. However, this might be due to the historic political change occurring within the major states of the Middle East, where an in action transformative process underway remakes the dynamics among the states of the region.<sup>66</sup> The reordering of the geopolitics of the region has exposed rivalries among the contenders for leadership, as well as different ideological, economic, nationalistic and sectarian agendas. This lust towards leadership is taking place partially as regional decision makers have concluded that the American commitment to the Middle East is waning.<sup>67</sup> Turkey has pursued to appoint themselves as regional leaders, intervening into conflicts like Syria's civil war with funding and weapons and seeking to affect the trajectory of Egyptian and Bahraini politics. For all their efforts, these would-be leaders have rarely obtained their objectives. Instead, they have triggered and fueled violence, political conflicts and polarization, deepening the endemic problems in the countries that they have sought to impact.<sup>68</sup> In the following paragraphs, the researcher is going to shed light on Turkey's main intentions and actions concerning Egypt.

### Turkey

Turkey has prided itself on being viewed as a modern role model. Turkey's rapidly growing economy, built on modern industrialization, along with its successful Islamist government, is shown as an illustration to be imitated.<sup>69</sup> From its negatively perceived Ottoman political history as a former imperial master of the Arab Middle East, Turkey is increasingly playing a proactive role in the Arab world that is gaining attention both domestically and regionally. Hence, Turkey has signed numerous political initiatives and cultural agreements with its Arab neighbors, has enhanced its role in the

<sup>64</sup> Gold, Zack, (2014), Security in the Sinai: Present and Future, ICCT: International Center for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, p 1.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Cook, Steven A., et al, (2014), The Contest for Regional Leadership in the New Middle East, Middle East Securities Series, p 3.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p 3

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p 3

<sup>69</sup> Ennis, crystal, A, Momani, Bessm A ( 2013), Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi foreign policy strategies., Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 6, p 1127.

Organization of Islamic Conference and has joined the Arab League as an observer. This has all occurred since the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) took power.<sup>70</sup> The AKP has increasingly embraced the Arab Middle East and reignited historical memories of Turkish involvement in the region in a more promising and positive light: a sort of Ottoman Revivalism or Neo-Ottomanism.<sup>71</sup> The Zero Problems Policy with Neighbors revitalized its Ottoman legacy but also tried to both increase interdependence with Arab neighbors and minimize any negative spill-over's. Within the Region, many people were receptive to Erdogan's Turkey. Islamists like Egypt's MB, who had previously voiced reservations about the AKP, now sought to fashion their own parties after it, and young Arab activists declared that Turkey had something to offer them.<sup>72</sup>

Turkey began to support the countries that started to experience democratic transformation. The electoral successes of MB parties in these countries were considered as a chance by the AKP government. Having itself grown out of Turkey's Islamist movement, the AKP leadership historically had relations with MB movements. Besides, the AKP presented itself as a model for the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood parties to work within a democratic system.<sup>73</sup> On the other side, the MB parties also referred to the AKP experience as useful to pass the message to the West and to domestic groups concerned about their democratic credentials.<sup>74</sup> The AKP government's support for "Arab Spring" countries took several forms. In Egypt the AKP provided election advice to the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the party of the Muslim Brotherhood especially during the presidential elections, mainly "to correct the image that the MB aims to monopolize political activity."<sup>75</sup> Once Mohammed Morsi came to power, Turkey committed to provide Egypt with \$US 2 billion, both to finance infrastructure projects and to contribute to foreign currency reserves.<sup>76</sup> Turkey also started to push for a new strategic partnership with post-Mubarak Egypt. Davutoglu stated that, "For the regional balance of power, we want to have a strong, very strong Egypt."<sup>77</sup> Thus, concerning countries where the previous leaders were ousted, Turkey eventually adopted a policy of establishing new ties such as with Egypt and Tunisia. During Morsi's presidency (2012-2013), Turkey's relations with Cairo were shaped by close political leadership circles, bypassing the more traditional bureaucracy of foreign policy making. However, their initiatives were more often ideological rather than realistic. Ankara has thus failed to achieve its aims, and has instead contributed to the isolation of the MB that led to their ousting. Morsi failed to live up to the promises he had given prior to the second round of the presidential elections, allegedly also due to advice from the AKP, and refused to share power. The Turkish government was also worried about its investments and trade relations, not least the \$1 billion loan granted to Egypt prior to the 30th of June revolution.<sup>78</sup>

Turkey prioritized its relations with the Brotherhood over those with the Egyptian people and state. This stance, headed by Erdogan, was honorable during the January 25 revolution. But after the June 30 revolution, it appears biased.

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<sup>70</sup> G Tol, (2012), 'The Turkish model in the Middle East', *Current History*, p 350

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p 351

<sup>72</sup> Cook, Stevens, A. *ibid*, p 6.

<sup>73</sup> Altunışık, Meliha Benli, (2013), *Turkey after the Arab Uprisings: Difficulties of Hanging on in There*, ISPI, Analysis No. 223, p 2.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, p 2

<sup>75</sup> Freedom and Justice Party seeks election advice from Turkey's ruling party, «Egypt Independent», 18 November 2011, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/freedom>.

<sup>76</sup> Turkey to provide Egypt \$2 billion in aid, «The Wall Street Journal», 15 September 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article>

<sup>77</sup> Shadid A., Turkey Predicts Alliance with Egypt as Regional Anchors, «The New York Times», 18 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

<sup>78</sup> Elman, Pinar, (2015), *Turkey's Policy towards Egypt and Its Deepening Isolation in the East Mediterranean*, *Bulletin*, p 1.

Erdogan's stance creates problems and feeds extremism - and will almost certainly see him lose popular support, not only in Egypt but also in Turkey.<sup>79</sup>

The Brotherhood's failure in the political sphere led to massive numbers of Egyptians taking to the street on June 30, 2013. Protesters called for early presidential elections. The regime ignored the people who took to the street, estimated at 30 million. The Egyptian army found itself obliged to meet the people's aspiration of ousting Mursi. So the army announced a roadmap for the duration of nine months.<sup>80</sup>

The Turkish stance towards Egypt was similar to that of the Brotherhood and its allies. Erdogan led a fierce campaign against Egypt and described the 30th of June revolution as a military coup. He also requested the U.N. and the Security Council to hold a consultative session on the Middle East with focus on the Egyptian crisis. He also incited Turkish and international rights organizations to pursue, as he claims, the criminals of the coup. He summoned Turkey's ambassador to Egypt for consultations. The Egyptian state did the same. Then Egypt decided to suspend naval maneuvers between the Turkish and the Egyptian armies in protest to Turkey's practices towards Egypt and in protest to Turkey's interference in Egyptian affairs. Turkey also hosted the international organization of the Brotherhood group's meetings twice since June 30 in order to formulate alternative plans to save the Brotherhood in Egypt. Erdogan's actions stirred Egyptians' anger as he ignored the popular will of officially ousting Mursi after the popular uprising.<sup>81</sup>

Turkish government, on the one hand, strongly condemned the military's actions and removal of Morsi and expressed concern over the violation of the democratic choice of Egyptian people as a step forward towards democratization. On the other hand, Turkish Media describing the 30<sup>th</sup> of June revolution, as a coup, has exacerbated the negative image of Turkey among Egyptians. Although, there were diverse reactions from different media groups to the events in Egypt, most of these groups have been supporting the government and reacting against Egyptian army's actions regarding the interruption of constitutional rule and removal of an elected president.<sup>82</sup> "It is the fact that Egypt has witnessed the overthrow of two presidents since the start of the Arab Springing 2011, Mubarak and Morsi. The former was forced to resign by the millions of protestors on the streets and the latter was removed from his democratically held post by a military coup d'état. The revolution which came after calls by millions of protestors for an end to corruption, injustice, poor economic conditions and also the 30-year-old autocratic Mubarak regime was ceased with military intervention by a coalition led by the Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Egypt has experienced a very catastrophic period from a revolution to a military coup d'état only in two years."

## CONCLUSIONS

War maneuvers constantly change. To destroy or destabilize an enemy doesn't depend exclusively on tactics of linear fire or movement. Qualitatively different tactics, which attack population, culture and infrastructure; strategic centers of gravity are currently used by organizations and countries to subvert political stability of countries to become easy prey for capture. These qualitatively different tactics are called Fourth Generation warfare. Egypt as a country which witnessed a sort of political transformation after two revolutions is now exposed to this type of war from internal and external enemies.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid

<sup>80</sup> Hamed, Mohamed, (September 2013), The Turkish stance towards Egypt, Al Arabiya Institute for Studies

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Yazici, Tolga, (2013), How The Turkish Media See The Coup D'état in Egypt in 2013: A Survey on Radikal and Star Newspapers, p 1

Internally Egypt is attacked from the Muslim brotherhood (MB) and its allies, the Jihadist extremist and terrorist gangs. MB used both soft and hard tactics to capture the minds and authority in Egypt and establish the Islamic State. From its beginning in 1928, MB knew its objective, how to capture the authority in Egypt? To achieve this objective, the MB used persuasion and violence. MB tried to change the culture and divert loyalty of Egyptians from their nation, Egypt, to MB. It tried to show Egyptians that their government has not been able to satisfy their demands but the MB as a social and religious organization can fill the gaps of the government. Persuasion by different mechanisms was used to socialize the Egyptians on the values, norms and attitudes of the MB. Synchronized with persuasion, MB resorted to violence, which it called Jihad on the way to God. So, resort to violence is religiously justified for it. MB tried to establish a new culture in Egypt; a culture which uses the word and the sword. Legitimate and illegitimate means are adopted to weaken the Egyptian state and replace it with the Islamic state.

Pursuing this objective, MB established coalitions and made deals with the terrorist groups in Sinai to terrify Egyptians not only in Sinai Peninsula but all over Egypt. Bombings and murdering military, police force and civilians occurred frequently. These terrorist groups tried to weaken the Egyptian authority in Sinai. They tried and succeeded to polarize the Sinai society and divide them to use them against the government. President Mohamed Morsi's cabinet released a big numbers of these terrorists to use them as a means of violence against Egyptians. Moreover, Morsi opened Sinai to receive as much as possible from these terrorist groups.

Externally, Egypt was exposed to coverts of regional partners, mainly Turkey. Oriented by its regional dream of leadership, Turkey was upset by the 30<sup>th</sup> of June Revolution in Egypt. The Islamist president his group, the channel which would have enabled Turkey to achieve its dream, were removed from authority. Egypt started to regain its regional power and this represented a threat to Turkey. Therefore, Turkey started to condemn the Egyptian revolution and toppling of the Islamist president. Erdogan left no opportunity to criticize of the new leadership in Egypt. He always interferes in the internal affairs, comments on judicial sentences and also exceeded to identify conditions for the Egyptian leadership to resume relationship with Turkey. Moreover, Turkey is the host state and resort for the MB's members who always attack Egypt and its leadership. Besides, a large part of the Turkish Media attacks the Egyptian leadership and describes demonstrations of the 30<sup>th</sup> of June as a coup not a revolution.

From the above-mentioned conclusion, it seems that Egypt falls between the anvil and the hammer. The anvil is the MB and its terrorist allies and the hammer is Turkey with its unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt as a sovereign state. What is required from Egyptians is to start quickly their political transition and democratic transformation to protect their country from internal and external threats.

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